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provement which the provisions of this section may have over the old
chancery test, the Hawkins decision clearly shows that the basic problem
which plagued the courts under the old test still exists under the new
statute. Because of the necessity of determining the primary and para-
mount relief being sought by the plaintiff, the court's efforts are still di-
verted from the substantive questions involved to a procedural issue. This
was exactly the evil complained of under the chancery test.23 An intense
discussion of this subject in Hawkins failed to produce any meaningful
criteria for determining the primary relief being sought in a particular
action. Thus, any future amendment of the statute should include some
provision clarifying the meaning of the term "primary and paramount
relief."
By accentuating the weaknesses of the present statute regulating ap-
peals on law and fact, the Hawkins decision has, by implication, suggested
the need for further legislative action on this subject. However, the ef-
fectiveness of any revision of section 2501.02 can only be determined by
the application of the statute to future law and fact appeals. Thus, un-
fortunately, the process of "trial and error" which has plagued this area
of appellate procedure for over a century seems destined to continue.
DALE C. LAPORTE
CIVIL PROCEDURE - SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION
IN OHIO - ACTIONS EX DELICTO
Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, 199 N.E.2d 869 (1964)
One of the most confused areas of Ohio law since 1945 has been the
rule concerning the number of causes of action available to an injured
party as a result of a single tortious act causing both personal injury and
property damage. Major factors contributing to this dilemma were the
presence in most cases of an insurer-subrogee' and the failure of the
bench and bar to distinguish law from dicta.2 The recent case of Shaw
v. Chell3 serves to dear up the confusion that has existed in this area
since the misinterpreted case of Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc.4 In Shaw it was
held that only one cause of action arises where a single tortious act causes
injury to both the person and property of the same party. Where, how-
ever, the plaintiff files a separate action for each of the injuries, and the
actions are pending simultaneously, the failure of the defendant to object
to the pendency of two actions between the same parties for the same
this legislative enactment are no longer controlling in this area." Hawkins v. Hawkins, 176
Ohio St. 469, 471, 200 N.E.2d 300, 302 (1964).
23. Westerhaus Co. v. Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 333, 135 N.E.2d 318, 323 (1956)
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cause will result in a waiver of the rule against splitting a cause of ac-
tion.' Before considering the holding in the subject case in more detail,
it is necessary to briefly examine the background of the problem.
The development of Ohio law in this area can be divided into two
segments, the dividing line being the 1945 case of Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc.'
Before the Vasu case, there was no doubt that a single tortious act gave an
injured party only a single cause of action.' Thus, an injured party had
1. No attempt is made here to deal with the insurance-subrogation problem as it relates to
splitting a cause of action. It is important, however, to note the basic rules dealing with the
insurance issue. Under the 1961 ruling in Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Davis, 172 Ohio St. 5, 173
N.E.2d 349 (1961), it appears that an insurer may bring a separate action for the amount
of its indemnification of the injured party if the tortfeasor, with knowledge of the insurer s
interest in the insured's action, fails to have the insurer joined in the action by the injured
party for his remaining damage (either the remaining property damage or personal injuries).
A plea of res judicata in a subsequent action by the insurer will not bar his recovery therein.
See id. at 13, 173 N.E.2d at 354 (concurring opinion.). Thus, whether or not the actions
by the insurer and the insured are simultaneous, the injured party must object and have the
two parties plaintiff joined or he will not be allowed to raise the first judgment rendered as
a bar to the continuation of the other suit.
For a more complete discussion of the conflicts and questions remaining in this area, see
Civil Procedure, Survey of Ohio Law - 1961, 13 W REs. L. REv. 421, 442 (1961).
2. It is frequently stated that in Ohio the syllabus of the court is the law. This has led to
the belief that there can be no obiter dicta in the court syllabus. This is incorrect. In Ameri-
can Mortgage Co. v. Rosenbaum, 114 Ohio St. 231, 151 N.E. 122 (1926), it was stated: "It
will be seen from the foregoing that it was not necessary, in order to decide that case, that
there should be a decision on the subject of motive. All that is therein said as to motive is
obiter." Id. at 235, 151 N.E. at 123. In Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich, 128 Ohio St.
124, 190 N.E. 403 (1934), the court discussed this question as follows:
It is of course true that the syllabus of a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
states the law of Ohio. However, that pronouncement must be interpreted with ref-
erence to the facts upon which it is predicated and the questions presented to and
considered by the Court It cannot be construed as being any broader than those
facts warrant. When obiter creeps into a syllabus it must be so recognized and so
considered. Id. at 126, 190 NE. at 404.
More recently Judge Stewart concurring in Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221,
147 N.E.2d 599, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958), in commenung on the weight to be
given to a syllabus paragraph in a prior decision, stated the following:
[N)either the discussion in the Vasu case as to whether a single or double cause of ac-
tion arises from one tort nor the language of the fourth paragraph of the syllabus
was necessary to decide the 'issue presented in the case, and obviously both such
language and such paragraph are obiter dicta and, therefore, are not as persuasive
an authority as if they had been appropriate to the question presented. Id. at 236,
147 N.E.2d at 608.
Thus, it would seem that the rule on the syllabus in Ohio is that the syllabus is the law
unless it is obiter dicta. It is unwise, therefore, even in Ohio, to use the syllabus of the supreme
court cases without confirming its relevance and necessity to the determination of the issue
presented for decision.
3. 176 Ohio St. 375, 199 N.E.2d 869 (1964).
4. 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 NE.2d 707 (1945).
5. The single cause of action rule had been reinstated in Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio
St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599, cert. dented, 358 U.S. 814 (1958.) The waiver rule was renewed
in Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, 199 NYE.2d 869 (1964).
6. In 1945, the case of Vasu.v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945),
announced a reversal of the rule then existing on the subject under consideration.
7. Mayfield v. Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28 (1932). (Cited as pre-1945 au-
thority in Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, 381, 199 NE.2d 869, 873 (1964)).
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to plead both property damage and personal injury in the same action
to avoid the risk of being precluded from recovery in the second
action by a plea of res judicata. But this rule was subject to the limitation
that where two actions were filed simultaneously, one for property damage
and the other for personal injuries sustained from the same tortious act,
the defendant's failure to object in the earlier action to the second action
would result in a waiver of the right to have the entire matter litigated
in one action.8 This was and remains today the rule in the majority of
American jurisdictions.'
The decision in the Vasu case, however, announced a change in the
law which was to cause confusion for nearly two decades. There, the
litigation began when plaintiff's insurer, by the terms of the insurance
contract, was assigned plaintiff's entire claim for property damage. In an
action on this claim, judgment was rendered against the insurer. In a
separate action for personal injuries filed in the same court and pending
at the same time, defendant pleaded the first judgment as a bar to the
second. The trial court rejected this plea and returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed ° and the plaintiff appealed to
the supreme court. There, the issue was not whether a plaintiff in a
tort action has separate causes of action for personal injuries and property
damage, but whether an insurer can maintain a separate action for the
amount of the property damage claim to which it has become subrogated
under the contract with the insured. The supreme court properly dis-
posed of this issue in paragraphs six, seven and eight of its syllabus, stat-
ing that an insurer could "prosecute a separate action against the party
causing such injury for reimbursement for indemnity monies paid 1"
8. Fox v. Althorp, 40 Ohio St. 322 (1883); Mayfield v. Kovac, supra note 7 The waiver
problem was first considered in the Fox case where a landlord was suing for four months
rent. Instead of instituting one action, he filed four separate actions. Defendant made no
objection to the severance and did not plead the first judgment in the other three. After
judgment was rendered in all the actions, the defendant-landlord appealed the last three ac-
tions on the ground of res judicata. The court, in rejecting his appeal, held that "the fair
presumption is that [defendant] acquiesced in the severance " Fox v. Althorp, supra
at 324. The Mayfield case applied the Fox waiver rule to an auto tort case involving injury
to person and property.
9. Twenty-two states and the federal jurisdiction have specifically heard cases on the single
cause of action rule and have held as had Ohio. See, e.g., Daniel v. City of Tucson, 52 Ariz.
142, 79 P.2d 516 (1938); Wells v. Wildin, 224 Iowa 913, 277 N.W 308 (1938); Con-
tinental Ins. Co. v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co., 93 Mich. 139, 53 N.W 394 (1892);
Cook v. Conners, 215 N.Y. 175, 109 N.E. 78 (1915); Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 Al. 59 (1922); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 Pac. 960
(1926) (all ex delicto cases)
The issue of waiver has not been as fully litigated, however, and the cases in accord with
the Ohio rule are scarce. See, e.g., Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Endsley, 167 Ga. 439, 145
S.E. 851 (1928) (simultaneous actions for personal injury and property damage); Todd v.
Central Petroleum Co., 155 Kan. 249, 124 P.2d 704 (1942) (simultaneous ex contractu
actions); Stapp v. Andrews, 172 Tenn. 610, 113 S.W.2d 749 (1938) (simultaneous ex
contractu actions).
10. Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., No. 2970, Ohio Ct. App. Mahoning County (Spring term, 1945)
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and that the "assignor is. not bound, as to third persons, by any judg-
ment which such third persons may obtain against his grantee or assignee
unless he participated in the action in such manner as to become,
in effect, a party."'" This holding was dispositive of the issues before
the court. Nevertheless, the court went on in paragraph four of the
syllabus to state the dictum which has given rise to the confusion in this
area. The court stated:
[I]njuries to both person and property suffered by the same person
as a result of the same wrongful act are infringements of different
rights and give rise to distinct causes of action, with the result that
the recovery or denial of recovery of compensation for damages to the
property is no bar to an action subsequently prosecuted for the per-
sonal injury, unless by an adverse judgment in the first action -issues
are determined against the plaintiff which operate as an estoppel against
him in the second action.12
Great significance has been attached to the syllabus in Ohio, and
accordingly the dictum in paragraph four of the syllabus in Vasu was
given substantive effect by both the bench and bar in subsequent cases. 3
11. Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 322, 61 N.E.2d 707, 709-10 (1945)
12. Id. at 321, 61 N.E.2d at 709.
13. In a survey of Ohio case law, two members of the Ohio Bar completely confused the
two issues in Vasa v. Kohlers, Inc. They came to the right conclusion about the insurance-
subrogaton problem for the reason of paragraph four of the syllabus, which was not at issue
in the case. See Hart & Hart, Review of Ohi Case Law for 1945, 32 Ohio Op. 467, 474-75
(1945). Confusion was compounded when Ohio Jursprudence stated paragraph four of
the syllabus as the rule in the case. 1 OHIO JUR. 2d, Actions § 76 (1953). In Markota v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 546, 97 N.E.2d 13 (1951) (unanimous decision), some indica-
tion was given that paragraph four of the Vasu syllabus was unnecessary to the determination
of that case. There the supreme court was called upon to rule on the quesuon whether several
elements of damage caused by the same transaction gave rise to separate causes of action.
Although the action was ex contractu and not ex delicto, the court was required to explain
and distinguish paragraph four of the Vasu syllabus as follows:
It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff, in the Vasu case, had not been a
party to the action brought by his indemnitor against the defendant; and, as indicated
by paragraph eight of the syllabus in the Vasu case, the plaintiff was not, therefore,
bound by the judgment against his indemnitor who had sought to recover from
that defendant the portion of the plaintiff's claim assigned to such indemnitor. 1d.
at 551, 97 N.E.2d at 16.
However, just two months after the decision in the Markota case, Judge Carpenter of the Court
of Appeals for Huron County referred, in a concurring opinion in Hughes v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 90 Ohio App. 278, 282 (1951), to the two causes of action of injuries to person
and to property that arise from the same tortious act. Judge Carpenter used paragraph four
of the Vasu syllabus as his authority.
The confusion was continued by the attempted explanation of the Vasu syllabus in Man-
sker v. Dealers Transp. Co., 160 Ohio St. 255, 116 N.E.2d 3 (1953), where Judge Zimmer-
man, writing for the court, discussed estoppel but did not comment on the main impact of
paragraph four of the Vasu syllabus, namely, that a separate cause of action arises for the
property damage and personal injuries resulting from the same tortious act. Judge Zimmer-
man stated that
actually, the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in the Vasu case means and was in-
tended to mean that where a second action is instituted upon a claim, demand or
cause of action different from that involved in the first action, the judgment in
the first action is not a bar to the prosecution of the second, but operates only as an
1965]
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A decade of confusion followed until 1958 when the case of Rush v.
Maple Heights4 was considered by the supreme court. There, plaintiff
asserted a right under the supposed rule in Vasu to bring separate
actions for personal injuries and property damage. But unlike the Vasu
case, Rush involved no insurer-subrogee to confuse the issue. The
supreme court erroneously recognized paragraph four of the Vasu syllabus
as law rather than dictum, but finally succeeded in correcting some of the
confusion by overruling it. The court thus returned to the rule prior
to Vasu by holding that only a single cause of action arises from a single
tortious act, the different injuries being merely different elements of
damage.1
5
The issue of waiver was not clarified in Rush, although both actions
in that case were pending simultaneously.'" It was not until the subject
case of Shaw v Chell'7 that the last vestige of confusion caused by the
dictum in Vasu was laid to rest. There, defendant Chell was the ad-
ministrator of the estate of one Montgomery The first action instituted
against Chell by plaintiff and his insurer was for recovery of property
damage claimed to have been proximately caused by the negligence of
defendant's decedent. The second suit was begun by plaintiff for per-
sonal injuries sustained in the same accident. At no time did defendant
object to the institution of the second suit. The trial of the property
damage claim resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $100.00, but against
plaintiff's insurer for the part of the claim to which the insurer had
become subrogated by payment to the plaintiff. After satisfying the
judgment in the property damage action, defendant set up that judgment
as a bar to the personal injury action. The trial court held against de-
fendant on thIs question, and the jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff.'8 The court of appeals affirmed.' 9
estoppel with regard to points or questions actually litigated and determined in the
first action. Id. at 259, 116 N.E.2d at 6.
The first sentence of paragraph four of the Vasu syllabus clearly states that the same tortious
act gives rise to two causes of action - one for property damage, the other for personal in-
juries. See p. 443 supra.
14. 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958)
15. Rush v. Maple Heights, supra note 14 at 235, 147 N.E.2d at 607
16. "Both the report of the Rush case and the briefs filed therein indicate that that question
[of waiver] was not raised or considered by this court in rendering its decision in that
case. " Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, 384, 199 N.E.2d 869, 875 (1964) Thus
any reference made to the waiver situation in the report of the Rush case would not have the
weight of law for "a reported decision, although in a case where the question might have
been raised, is entitled to no consideration whatever as settling, by judicial determination, a
question not passed upon or raised at the time of the adjudication." State ex rel. Gordon v.
Rhodes, 158 Ohio St. 129, 131, 107 N.E.2d 206, 208 (1952)
17 176 Ohio St. 375, 199 N.E.2d 869 (1964)
18. Shaw v. Chell, No. 29490, Ohio C.P., Portage County, May 31, 1962.
19. Shaw v. Chell, No. 278, Ohio Ct. App., Portage County, June 24, 1963 (no written
opinion).
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In reviewing the court of appeals decision, the supreme court pointed
out that although there was originally an insurer as a party plaintiff in
Shaw, after the judgment against the insurer in the first action the situa-
tion was identical to the situation in the Rush case. But although the
court accepted the rule of the Rush case that but one cause of action
arises from a single tortious act,2" it went on to distinguish the Rush
case as to the waiver question. The court noted that the Rush case was
not in point, for "that question was not raised or considered by this court
in rendering its decision in that case.. .2 The issue of waiver, there-
fore, had to be reasoned anew.
Beginning with the assumption that only one cause of action arises
from a single tortious act, the court developed its logic on the basis of
two sections of the Ohio Revised Code. First, the court noted that sec-
tion 2309.08 provides that a "defendant may demur to a petition only
when it appears on its face that. another action [is] pending between
the same parties for the same cause ..."' Section 2309.10 further
requires that "when on the face of the petition, no ground of demurrer
appears, the objection may be taken by answer. If the objection is not
made either way, the defendant has waived it.. ."' On the basis of
these provisions, the court concluded that "by failing to so amend his
answer, defendant certainly waived his right to object that the concurrent
pendency of the property damage and personal injury actions represented
a splitting of plaintiff's single cause of action."' The waiver rule that
existed before Vasu was thus dearly re-established.
On both the issue of splitting a cause of action and the issue of
waiver, the present status of Ohio law appears to be exactly what it was
prior to Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc.25  Only one cause of action arises where
a single tortious act causes injury to both the person and property of the
20. Compare syllabus paragraph one of Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, 199 N.E.2d 869
(1964) with the syllabus paragraph of Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d
599, cert. dented, 358 U.S. 814 (1958).
21. See note 16 supra.
22. OHIO REV. CODE § 2309.08.
23. OHIO REV. CODE § 2309.10.
24. Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, 380, 199 N.E.2d 869, 872-73 (1964) The court
concluded in paragraph three of the syllabus that
where an action to recover for personal injuries caused by the negligence of a de-
fendant is commenced by a plaintiff and service of summons is made therein on
the defendant before trial of a separate action by plaintiff to recover for property
damage caused by the same negligence, (1) the defendant can amend his answer in
the property damage action so as to allege that the personal injury action is pending
and is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, (2) the
defendant, by failing to so amend his answer before judgment is rendered in the
property damage action, waives his right to object and thereby consents to the plain-
tiff's splitting of his single cause of action, and (3) defendant cannot thereafter
plead a judgment for the plaintiff in the property damage action as a bar to the per-
sonal injury action. Id. at 375, 199 N.E.2d at 870.
25. 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
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